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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The British population’s decision to withdraw the United 
Kingdom from the European Union was a major shock 
to the international order. Though most international 
attention on the subject has fixated on the broader political 
and economic implications, there is a not insignificant 
BREXIT effect on the manner in which the European 
Union and United Kingdom view and execute economic 
sanctions policies, at least in the long term. Just as other 
trade and foreign policy matters were intertwined by the 
United Kingdom and European Union until BREXIT, 
sanctions policies were joined together and they had 
an impact both in the selection and the execution of  
sanctions decisions by both the United Kingdom and 
the European Union.  Even beyond matters of  policy, 
the United Kingdom was (and, for the time being, is) a 
major contributor of  information and capability to the 
EU sanctions machine.  How the European Union will 
adapt to its absence on more practical terms remains to 
be seen.
This paper reviews the legal and political history of  EU 
and UK sanctions policies since the Lisbon Treaty came 
into effect in 2009. It then reviews three cases of  sanctions 
enforcement—against Iran, against Russia, and against 
terrorists—to identify common interests and themes, 
as well as differences, in how the United Kingdom and 
European Union perceived sanctions enforcement.
It offers three observations and two recommendations 
in conclusion:
1. First and notwithstanding some speculation to the 
contrary, the European Union and United Kingdom 
are likelier to maintain a consistent sanctions posture 
than they are to split, certainly in the near- to mid-
term. 
2. Second, there is some chance of  a long-term shift in 
EU and UK perspectives on sanctions, depending on 
whether the respective self-interests of  the European 
Union and United Kingdom also shift in the future.
3. Third, what’s more likely to change in the future is 
not the desire of  the European Union or United 
Kingdom to impose sanctions in response to bad 
behavior, but rather the tools to be used. 
The authors recommend, first, that the European Union 
and the United Kingdom build into whatever succeeds the 
United Kingdom’s formal involvement in the European 
Union the capacity for coordination of  sanctions actions. 
Even if  both the United Kingdom and European Union 
retain separate decision-making apparatus for sanctions 
enforcement, having some kind of  formal role for one 
another in advising the creation of  sanctions rules would 
help to preserve at least some of  the benefits that existed 
prior to BREXIT, particularly harmonization. 
Second, the authors recommend that the United 
States should formalize its various efforts at sanctions 
coordination through the creation of  “like-minded” 
coalitions on particular issues. Like-minded collectives 
existed to deal with Iran and North Korea, and a scaled-up 
approach could involve annual gatherings of  European, 
British, East Asian, and other interested governments 
to discuss a range of  sanctions topics. These gatherings 
would not replace the need for UK–EU interaction, but 
they would help create a floor for this interaction while 
at the same time reducing some of  the tensions that 
arise from time to time between the United States and its 
normal sanctions partners. Taken in combination with 
other mechanisms for UK–EU sanctions coordination 
(such as the presence of  France as a permanent member 
of  the UN Security Council alongside the United 
Kingdom), such a like-minded coalition would at a 
minimum help to smooth the transition that is inevitable 
as BREXIT takes place. 
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The British vote to exit the European Union on June 
23 has jolted affairs both in the United Kingdom and 
beyond.  Though “Leave” was gaining steam in polling 
conducted prior to the British referendum, there was 
widespread conviction (particularly in markets) that the 
public would ultimately decide to support remaining in 
the European Union.  This conviction was wrong.
Three months after the BREXIT vote, much has 
already changed in the United Kingdom. Prime Minister 
David Cameron, who supported the referendum but 
opposed an exit from the European Union, resigned 
in deference to those in the Conservative Party who 
campaigned on behalf  of  “Leave.” Theresa May, the 
former Home Secretary, has become Prime Minister 
and reshuffled the UK cabinet, including by dividing 
the duties of  the Foreign Secretary among three other 
“Leave” campaigners. The European Union and United 
Kingdom have begun discussions about the dimensions 
of  the British exit, with some indications that the British 
will seek to maintain some kind of  association with the 
European Union to preserve its access to European 
markets. EU leaders have expressed openness to such 
an arrangement, but underscored the degree to which 
access to the European Union will be contingent on 
British acceptance of  EU rules. The United Kingdom 
has also not yet formally invoked Article 50 of  the Lisbon 
Treaty, which triggers a two-year exit process, adding to 
the confusion surrounding British intentions and how 
the European Union and United Kingdom will interact 
whenever BREXIT becomes a reality.1 
With such fundamental matters still up in the air, it is not 
surprising that there is tremendous uncertainty within 
and outside of  Europe about the future direction of  UK 
and EU foreign policy, much less UK and EU sanctions 
policy.  It is likely that we will not know even the legal 
dimensions of  UK and EU sanctions policy for many 
months; it will take even longer to see how policymaking 
is affected.
Though a niche subject, the evolution of  UK and EU 
sanctions policy is no petty matter. As EU sanctions 
researcher Clara Portela noted, “while the EU’s Common 
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) was launched with 
fanfare in 1999, and was intended to break new ground in 
European foreign policy by allowing the Union to carry 
out joint military operations, it is sanctions that have 
taken centre stage.”2 The European Union has pursued 
sanctions as a means of  projecting power and influencing 
foreign behavior in several regions and in response to a 
variety of  provocations over the past twenty years; prior 
to BREXIT, sanctions were figured to remain a core 
element of  the CSDP.
The question now is whether sanctions will remain a 
focus of  EU (and British) foreign policy. Some have 
speculated, with respect to Russia, that with one of  
the main advocates of  sanctions pressure leaving the 
European Union, BREXIT will usher in an era of  
reduced sanctions use.3 Yet this suggests a simplistic 
understanding of  how the European Union works and 
the mesh of  complicated interests and calculations that 
goes into every sanctions decision. In our experience, in 
fact, there are times in which the British could be more 
skeptical of  sanctions imposition than their partners 
on the European continent. Such skepticism largely 
stemmed from a difference in view on both the efficacy 
of  the sanctions measures in play as well as interests in the 
underlying problem sanctions were intended to address. 
But certainly there were times in which the British were 
undeniable drivers of  sanctions decisions.
It is likely that complex calculations of  national and 
institutional interest will continue to drive EU and 
UK sanctions policies even after BREXIT. What will 
change is the degree to which British interests will 
directly influence the decisions under consideration, as 
well as how the British choose to cooperate with EU 
sanctions decisions with which they may disagree. It 
is perhaps obvious, but still important, to underscore 
that though the United Kingdom was an important 
part of  the EU economy, UK–EU economic ties are 
probably not sufficient to permit the United Kingdom 
to impose its will on a skeptical European Union absent 
a vote in the process, particularly if  financial institutions 
based presently in London reconsider their position 
following BREXIT.4 On the other hand, the European 
INTRODUCTION
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Union remains a critically important part of  the United 
Kingdom’s economy, constituting half  of  its total trade 
balance.5 Pure economic muscle is not necessarily a 
good proxy for how diplomacy works (in fact, one can 
argue that the United Kingdom has been exercising 
disproportionate political power compared to its military 
and economic weight since the end of  World War II). 
Still, such practical considerations matter when tough 
choices have to be made.
In this paper, we examine the EU and UK legal frameworks 
associated with sanctions today. We also look into the 
sanctions policies enacted to date in both the European 
Union and the United Kingdom independently, as well 
as British views on the main current, driving sanctions 
topics. We conclude with observations about the short-
term and long-term impact of  BREXIT on EU and UK 
sanctions policies. Overall, we assess that though there 
may be little change in the near future, there is a chance 
that divergent national interests – in part brought about 
by the economic consequences of  BREXIT on the 
British economy – will fuel differences in the years to 
come. We note that these differences could, in time, also 
create frictions with the United States and complicate – 
if  not compromise – the Special Relationship that exists 
today.
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REVIEW OF EUROPEAN SANCTIONS LAW AND PRACTICE
The Council of  the European Union describes sanctions 
as “one of  the EU’s tools to promote the objectives of  
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): peace, 
democracy and the respect for the rule of  law, human rights 
and international law.”6 The use of  trade and financial 
sanctions by the European Union and, by extension, 
the United Kingdom has increased markedly over the 
last decade. Between 2010 and 2011, the number of  EU 
sanctions decisions trebled, jumping from 22 to 69.7 As 
of  July 2016, the Council has issued over 200 decisions 
related to sanctions imposing over 30 separate sanctions 
regimes.8 The Council initially focused on implementing 
terrorism, human rights and nonproliferation targeted 
sanctions, mandated by the UN Security Council, but 
eventually expanded its measures to Libya, Syria, Iran, 
and Russia.   
How EU Sanctions Are Created and Managed
The structure of  the European Union and its foreign 
policy making underscores the degree to which reliance 
on sanctions is a sustained, deliberate decision of  the 
whole of  Europe (even if  some parts of  the European 
Union express reticence from time to time). The 
European Council, consisting of  the heads of  state of  
each member of  the European Union as well as the 
President of  the European Council and the President 
of  the European Commission, has ultimate authority 
to impose EU sanctions and operates on the basis of  
consensus decision-making. Article 215 of  the Treaty 
on the Functioning of  the European Union (TFEU) 
provides the legal basis for the Council’s authority.9 The 
TFEU gives the Council authority to interpret or reduce 
the European Union’s economic and financial relations 
with one or more third countries, where such measures 
are necessary to achieve the objectives of  the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.10 Accordingly, the Council 
has broad authority to impose sanctions in pursuit of  the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
The vast majority of  the negotiation among members, 
however, is actually done among the Committee of  
Permanent Representatives, or COREPER, made up 
of  the head or deputy head of  mission from each EU 
member state in Brussels. The COREPER produces 
the agenda for the Council meetings and prepares the 
major political decisions for leaders. The COREPER 
also may make some procedural decisions and other 
decisions delegated by the Council, such as approving 
sanctions designations of  individuals and entities under 
criteria established by the Council. In this process, the 
UK has been a valued participant, providing information 
to support sanctions actions as well as ideas about how 
they can be drafted and implemented.
EU members, like all UN member states, are obligated 
by Chapter VII of  the Charter of  the United Nations 
to implement all sanctions imposed by the UN Security 
Council.11 The Council implements the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) measures by adopting a Common 
Position that establishes the framework of  the sanctions 
regime.12 In this, the UK and France have often been 
leaders, given their role as permanent members of  the 
UNSC. It is an open question how the UK’s departure 
will affect this work.
In addition, the Council may impose sanctions 
independently, either to reinforce UN Security Council 
sanctions by applying stricter and additional measures, 
such as with sanctions for Iran, or to impose purely 
autonomous sanctions regimes separate from any action 
by the United Nations, such as sanctions for Syria and 
Russia. 
Certain sanctions, such as arms embargoes and travel 
bans, are implemented directly by EU member states. 
Such measures only require a decision by the Council. 
This decision is directly binding on EU member states, 
which are obligated to enforce the bans on individuals 
and businesses, but the enforcement is itself  solely 
within the jurisdiction of  member states and in many 
cases supplementary national legislation is necessary to 
bring these sanctions into force. 
Economic measures such as asset freezes and export bans, by 
contrast, fall under the competence of  the Union and therefore 
require separate implementing legislation in the form of  a 
Council regulation, which is directly binding on EU citizens 
and businesses. The regulation, adopted on the basis of  a joint 
proposal from the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy and the European Commission, contains 
the details on the precise scope of  the measures decided upon 
by the Council and their implementation. 
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Nonetheless, even where Council decisions are directly 
binding on individuals and entities in the European 
Union, member states must still establish authorities to 
impose penalties for violations of  the sanctions.  Many 
European countries have not yet taken this step, meaning 
that although certain transactions with sanctioned 
countries or persons are illegal, there are no immediate 
consequences under national law for violating those 
prohibitions.  Moreover, there are no clear guidelines for 
compelling member states to adopt the requisite national 
legislation nor to punish those whose legislation – or 
enforcement of  it – is insufficient.  
EU Sanctions Tools
Like the United States, the European Union turns 
regularly to familiar restrictions when developing a new 
sanctions program. Below are some of  the most frequent 
tools used by the European Union.13 
• Asset freeze:  An asset freeze prohibits the transfer of  
funds and economic resources owned or controlled 
by targeted individuals or entities.  Funds such as 
cash, checks, bank deposits, stocks, and shares may 
not be accessed, moved, or sold.  An asset freeze also 
includes a ban on providing resources to the targeted 
entities and persons. In certain cases, national 
competent authorities can authorize exceptions 
from the asset freeze under specific exemptions, for 
instance to cover basic needs (such as foodstuffs, 
rent, medicines, or taxes) or reasonable legal fees. 
• Sectoral sanctions: The European Union may 
place restrictions on dealing with entire industries. 
Sectoral sanctions regimes generally fall into one of  
two categories: (i) sanctions intended to prevent the 
targeted country from receiving goods and services 
that assist its perceived misconduct, and (ii) sanctions 
intended to pressure a targeted country indirectly 
through cutting off  access by key industries to EU 
funds, services, and investment.14 For example, the 
European Union placed restrictions on the export of  
nuclear-related goods to Iran to avoid contributing 
to Iran’s attempts to develop nuclear weaponry. 
By contrast, the European Union also placed 
restrictions on certain state-owned Russian banks 
obtaining funding from EU capital markets in order 
to place general economic pressure on the Russian 
government in connection to its actions in Ukraine.
• Arms embargo:  An arms embargo normally prohibits 
the sale, supply, or transfer of  the goods included 
in the EU common military list, as well as technical 
and financial assistance. In addition, the export 
of  equipment used for internal repression may be 
prohibited, such as police equipment not covered 
by the EU common military list. The Council might 
also ban the export of  dual-use goods to targeted 
countries, i.e. those that can be used for both civil 
and military purposes, as set out on the EU list of  
dual-use goods.15 
• Visa or travel bans: Persons targeted by a travel ban 
will not be granted visa for entering the European 
Union and will be denied entry to the European 
Union at the external borders. However, EU 
sanctions never oblige a member state to refuse 
entry to its own nationals. If  an EU citizen is subject 
to a travel ban, his home country must, subject to 
national legal provisions, admit that person.  Member 
states may grant exemptions to travel bans when they 
host certain multilateral bodies or meetings in their 
territories and implementation is left to individual 
member states, with guidance from Europol and 
Interpol as appropriate.
Challenges and the EU response
European sanctions have faced a significant threat in 
recent years from the rulings of  the European Court of  
Justice (ECJ), the European Court of  Human Rights  and 
numerous judicial rulings delisting designated individuals 
and entities from sanctions lists based on lack of  evidence 
or due process concerns. The ECJ’s two decisions in Kadi 
v. Commission, known colloquially as Kadi I16 and Kadi 
II17, began the acceleration of  judicial delistings and also 
established a set of  due process standards that European 
officials have struggled to meet.  
Yassin Abdullah Kadi was listed by the UN Security 
Council as a supporter of  al Qaeda and subjected to 
an asset freeze and travel ban.  The European Union 
subsequently implemented the sanctions on Kadi, and Mr. 
Kadi challenged the sanctions in the European General 
Court.  In 2008, the ECJ found that the Security Council 
measures could not prejudice the individual rights granted 
to Mr. Kadi by European treaties. The court found that 
the EU regulation imposing the sanctions was a violation 
of  Mr. Kadi’s right to effective judicial review and the 
BREXIT’S IMPLICATIONS FOR UK AND EUROPEAN SANCTIONS POLICY
energypolicy.columbia.edu | OCTOBER 2016 | 9
right to property because he had not been informed of  
the grounds for his inclusion in the list of  individuals and 
entities subject to sanctions.
Following the Kadi decision, the European courts granted 
numerous delisting petitions, including from individuals 
designated as terrorists and terrorism financiers, as well 
as Iranian state agencies accused of  supporting the illicit 
nuclear program.18 
European officials took three significant steps to staunch 
the judicial delistings. First, the European Union sought 
to increase the ECJ’s deference to the UN process by 
working with Security Council members to provide 
additional process for delisting petitions at the UN. In 
2006, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1730 
(2006)19 to establish a focal point to receive de-listing 
requests within the Secretariat. Sanctioned individuals 
were henceforth permitted to submit delisting requests 
either through the focal point or through their State of  
residence or citizenship (a principle that applies beyond 
just terrorism and includes all UN sanctions programs 
involving individual or entity designation). Following the 
Kadi I decision, however, the Security Council went a step 
further and adopted resolution 1904 (2009) to establish a 
new office of  an independent Ombudsperson to review 
petitions for delisting from the al Qaeda sanctions list.20The 
Ombudsperson collects information, communicates 
with petitioners, and issues a report to the Sanctions 
Committee to recommend removal or maintenance on 
the sanctions list. If  the Sanctions Committee denies the 
petition for removal, the Ombudsperson informs the 
petitioner of  the Committee’s reasons, provided they 
are not confidential.  Since the Ombudsperson’s powers 
were enlarged in 2011, the Security Council has never 
overturned one of  her recommendations to delist.    
The establishment of  the Ombudsperson did not have 
a concrete impact on Mr. Kadi’s petition. His appeal 
returned to the ECJ in 2013. In his report to the court, 
the Advocate General praised the Ombudsperson for 
providing a rigorous review of  the justification for 
the listing and said the Ombudsperson had made it 
possible to raise the quality of  the list considerably.21 
He argued that EU institutions should defer to listing 
decisions made by the Security Council and nullify the 
implementing regulations only if  a European court 
finds the sufficiency of  the information to be manifestly 
inadequate or erroneous.22 Nonetheless, in its decision in 
Kadi II, the ECJ didn’t adopt such a deferential standard 
of  review, and found that the basis for the listing of  
Mr. Kadi was not well founded based on the evidence 
produced to the court.23 (The ECJ also did not comment 
on the sufficiency of  the Ombudsperson process.)
Second, the EU adopted new procedures for EU courts 
to review information underlying the listing without 
disclosing it to the petitioner. The Rules of  Procedure 
of  the General Court allow the court to review classified 
information produced by an EU member state.24 The 
court may decide what material is relevant for the decision 
and what material should be produced to the petitioner, 
such as a non-classified summary of  the information.25 
If  the Member State refuses to comply with the court’s 
conditions, the court may not consider the classified 
information. Notably, the UK did not support the rule 
change, arguing that the proposed rule did not allow 
member states to withdraw the classified information 
at any time or to review draft judgments to ensure 
no classified information is accidentally disclosed.26 
Although the EU adopted the new rules on July 1, 
2015, the Court is still determining how to implement 
the changes and has yet to review classified information 
under these procedures.
The European Union’s third step to quell sanctions 
delisting was to take a more considered and conservative 
approach to sanctions listings. In 2013, immediately 
following the Kadi II decision, the Council adopted 
guidelines on implementation and evaluation of  restrictive 
measures in the framework of  the EU Common Foreign 
and Security Policy.27 The guidelines established best 
practices for assessing new listings and encouraged 
member states to share relevant information that might 
support new listings. In 2015, the Council updated the 
best practices, once again encouraging member states 
to share intelligence and other information that might 
support new listings and buttress existing ones.28 The 
European Union also has adopted a preference on more 
systemic sanctions, which are not themselves subject to 
the same due process considerations (for example, if  
the European Union were to sanction a government or 
industry altogether, then the European Union would only 
need to prove the entity was involved in that government 
or industry’s activities).
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EU sanctions have direct effect in the United Kingdom 
and impose obligations on UK persons. The United 
Kingdom may then enact statutory instruments that make 
it a criminal offence in the United Kingdom to breach 
a particular EU Regulation and establish penalties.29 
Typically, Parliament passes a new statutory instrument 
to establish each new sanctions regime, although the 
draft Policing and Crime Bill proposes to allow for 
faster implementation of  UN sanctions in the United 
Kingdom, essentially allowing them to be implemented 
on a temporary basis until applicable EU measures are 
enacted. The relevant statute governs the nature of  the 
restriction, the circumstances in which a license may be 
granted and the relevant reporting requirements. 
The United Kingdom also imposes designations beyond 
those adopted by the European Union or United Nations, 
particularly for terrorism targets.  
The UK sanctions regime applies to any person or entity 
within the United Kingdom and any person elsewhere 
who is a UK national or an entity incorporated or 
constituted under UK law.30 Foreign subsidiaries of  
UK companies do not have to comply with the UK 
financial sanctions regime. Nonetheless, UK sanctions 
have broad extraterritorial impact. UK nationals 
employed by subsidiaries remain subject to the UK and 
EU financial sanctions regimes and could inadvertently 
commit a criminal offence if  they take steps for the 
foreign subsidiary that are prohibited by the EU or UK 
sanctions. Moreover, transactions that originate overseas 
nevertheless may cause accounting entries to be made 
in London where the revenue is then received. If  a UK 
company is profiting from the overseas conduct of  its 
foreign subsidiary, which would be a breach of  EU 
or UK sanctions if  the UK company carried out the 
conduct, the UK parent could become liable under the 
UK anti-money laundering legislation, the Proceeds of  
Crime Act 2002 (POCA). Furthermore, if  the UK parent 
is financing or in any other way assisting the conduct 
of  its foreign subsidiary, it could also commit offences 
under the Serious Crime Act, which effectively makes it 
an offence to assist someone in doing something which 
you yourself  could not do.
Asset freezes imposed by the United Kingdom, either 
unilaterally or pursuant to an EU listing, prohibit three 
sets of  activities:
• Making funds or economic resources available, 
directly or indirectly, knowing or having reasonable 
cause to suspect that the funds are being made 
available to or for the benefit of  a target (the terms 
“listed person” or “designated person” are commonly 
used to describe sanctions targets);31 
• Dealing with funds or economic resources, which 
includes other assets owned, held or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by a target, or a person acting 
on behalf  of  a target, knowing or having reasonable 
cause to suspect that the funds are owned, held, or 
controlled by a target;32 
• Participating, knowingly and intentionally, in 
activities the object or effect of  which is:
o to directly or indirectly circumvent the 
prohibitions on making funds available and 
dealing with funds; or
o to enable or facilitate the commission of  the 
offences listed above.33 
HM Treasury is responsible for administering and 
enforcing financial sanctions in the UK.  This work has 
historically been carried out by its Financial Sanctions 
Unit (FSU), which was replaced in April 2016 by the 
Office of  Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI). 
The OFSI maintains a consolidated list of  sanctions 
targets that includes the names of  individuals and 
entities that have been listed by the UN, the European 
Union and/or the United Kingdom under specific 
financial sanctions legislation.34 The OFSI updates the 
consolidated list whenever the UK financial sanctions 
regime is updated.
Neither the OFSI nor HM Treasury brings prosecutions 
of  sanctions breaches, although proposed changes in 
the draft Policing and Crime Bill would give OFSI a new 
power to impose civil monetary penalties in certain cases.35 
Prosecutions have been brought by the UK Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO) and HM Revenue and Customs.  With 
respect to the financial services sector, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) has regulatory oversight of  the 
systems and controls that regulated firms must have in 
place to reduce the risk that a breach might occur.  Thus, 
the FCA may bring enforcement actions against firms that 
have committed breaches of  UK financial sanctions under 
rules that require firms to have effective systems and 
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controls to counter the risk that the firm might be used for 
the purposes of  financial crime. The Crown Prosecution 
Service may also prosecute for breaches of  trade sanctions 
under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979.36 
The current maximum penalty in the United Kingdom 
for a financial sanctions criminal offence is imprisonment 
for two years and an unlimited fine, although offences 
under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act of  2010 carry a 
term of  imprisonment of  seven years.  Where the offence 
has been committed by a company and is shown to have 
been committed with the consent or connivance, or 
because of  the neglect, of  a director, manager, secretary 
or similar officer, that person is also guilty of  an offence 
and can be imprisoned or fined.
Proposals included in the draft Policing and Crime Bill 
aim to broaden the enforcement options available to 
UK authorities including by: increasing the maximum 
penalty for a financial sanctions breach from two to 
seven years; amending existing law to allow for deferred 
prosecution agreements and serious crime prevention 
orders in financial sanctions cases; and allowing the 
OFSI to impose financial penalties for financial sanctions 
breaches in cases where it may be difficult to prove a 
breach to a criminal standard. At the time of  writing, the 
bill was still being debated in the Houses of  Parliament 
and, therefore, may be subject to further amendments.
Despite the significant increase in the application of  
sanctions by the European Union and the United 
Kingdom over the past decade, enforcement actions have 
not kept pace. Nevertheless, there have been a number 
of  significant fines handed out to institutions and prison 
sentences handed to individuals by the UK authorities 
that may indicate increased enforcement activity to 
come.37 Likewise, the proposed amendments to the law 
in this area discussed above could lead to an increased 
risk of  enforcement in the future.
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The preceding sections make clear that, though the 
European Union has increasingly adopted an activist 
streak in imposing economic sanctions and is the 
competent authority for EU states in this regard, member 
states retained both their own rights to impose some 
measures that have the same effect as sanctions and—
in the case of  the United Kingdom—the readiness to 
exercise those rights.
This speaks to a broader issue in examining the 
implications of  BREXIT: the degree to which the United 
Kingdom has been a proponent of  sanctions action or a 
follower of  dictates from Brussels. Perhaps not surprising, 
the United Kingdom has been both, depending on the 
issues involved and the interests at stake. In this section, 
we will look at three subjects of  sanctions policy since 
Lisbon entered fully into force in 2009: Iran, Russia, and 
terrorism.
Iran
The British position on Iran’s nuclear program evolved 
over time.  In 2003-2005, the United Kingdom was 
an advocate of  and participant in direct talks with 
Iran intended to correct Iran’s multiple failures over 
decades to comply with the terms of  the Treaty on 
the Nonproliferation of  Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and 
Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These talks, which 
the United Kingdom initiated along with France and 
Germany (creating the so-called EU-3 or E-3), delayed 
the imposition of  sanctions measures against Iran by 
the United Nations by prompting the withholding of  a 
finding of  Iranian noncompliance with its nuclear treaty 
obligations. Not surprisingly, they also created tensions 
with the United States, which was – at the time – pressing 
for an immediate referral of  the issue to the UN Security 
Council. However, when the EU-3 process with Iran came 
to an end in August 2005 amid mutual recriminations 
of  bad faith in the negotiations and prompted by Iran’s 
restart of  some then-suspended nuclear activities, 
the United Kingdom became a strong supporter of  
economic sanctions against Iran. In fact, unlike any other 
member of  the European Union, the United Kingdom 
adopted its own, national sanctions measures against 
Iran, imposing targeted designations of  Iranian banks, 
entities and individuals under British law in addition to 
designations mandated by Brussels. These designations 
were later invalidated due to an insufficient evidentiary 
basis.38 But, for purposes of  this assessment – focusing 
as it does on whether British and EU sanctions policy 
will shift after BREXIT – this does not undermine the 
point that the British government was prepared to take 
sanctions action against Iran.  Rather, this development 
merely suggests that the legal and evidentiary processes 
governing sanctions imposition need to be improved.
There are many explanations available for the British 
focus on sanctions as a policy instrument. The most 
direct is that, having decided that the Iranian nuclear 
program – as it was – presented a major challenge to the 
security order in the Middle East, the United Kingdom 
sought any means of  persuading Iran to back down 
from its chosen course of  action. This explanation jives 
well with British rhetoric in 2005-2015 and the United 
Kingdom’s persistent support of  both the engagement 
and pressure tracks of  the P5+1 and American approach 
toward Iran.
However, there are two additional factors that merit 
consideration, as they speak to British calculations on 
sanctions. The first is that, put simply, Iran was not a 
major trading partner prior to the sanctions regime being 
established and that there was little to lose economically. 
Figure 1 underscores the relative insignificance of  trade 
with Iran to the UK economy both prior to and following 
the expansion of  sanctions on Iran in the late 2000s.  
As a consequence (and as Figure 2 shows), even when 
UK trade with Iran dropped after 2011 (when there was a 
massive spike in purchases of  Iranian oil during a period 
of  significant market tightness and high prices), it simply 
did not have that far to go. Data from the UK’s Office 
of  National Statistics and the European Union suggest 
that Iran–UK trade in services was similarly de minimis 
during this time period.39 
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Figure 1: UK-Iran and UK-MENA Goods Trade, 2000-2015
Figure 2: UK-Iran Goods Trade, 2000-2015
Source: HM’s Revenue and Customs.
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From this reading, sanctions were a relatively low-cost 
strategic tool for the United Kingdom and therefore 
easier to use from the standpoint that they would have 
less impact on British economic interests. But, sanctions 
also served another purpose: presenting a potentially 
viable path forward to skeptical US and regional partners. 
There was widespread doubt in the Bush administration 
that sanctions would contribute much to a change in the 
Iranian mind-set with respect to the nuclear program; 
reflections of  that debate include talk about the possibility 
of  military force instead being employed against Iran.40 
Even after President Obama took office, there were many 
within the US government who suspected that sanctions 
would not be sufficient to compel Iran to change course.  
However, as was made clear during the debate over the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of  Action (JCPOA) reached between 
the P5+1 and Iran, there were others who saw the sanctions 
campaign, the engagement drive, and the US commitment 
to pursuing an honest dual-track strategy as not only good 
sense, but also instrumental for keeping the international 
community united vis-à-vis Iran. International voices 
pushing back against talk of  military action, including UK 
Foreign Secretary Jack Straw in 200441, contributed to this 
sense during both the Bush and Obama administrations. 
Straw himself  pointed to the necessity of  avoiding the 
domestic political difficulties that would have come along 
with military action against Iran during his tenure as 
Foreign Secretary.42 Others argued that the resolution of  
the Iranian nuclear issue was best achieved via dialogue43 
and even that precipitous military action could push Iran 
to end its hedging strategy and embark on a more assertive 
nuclear weapons program.44 Either way, these international 
advocates also then bore the responsibility of  helping to 
create the sanctions atmosphere that could compel Iranian 
nuclear concessions and successful negotiations.45 In fact, 
the P5+1 offer to Iran in 2006 and adoption of  the first 
UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on 
Iran were directly linked, with the foreign ministers of  
the P5+1 and Javier Solana agreeing in advance that Iran’s 
failure to accept a diplomatic path necessitated moving 
down the sanctions path. Even after the Joint Plan of  
Action was adopted in November 2013 – setting the stage 
for talks on a comprehensive agreement – British Foreign 
Secretary William Hague suggested that the British role in 
this endeavor was as much about “[bridging] the narrow 
gaps between the parties” as it was about the United 
Kingdom’s own concerns with Iran’s nuclear program.46 
In other words, the United Kingdom was concerned 
about Iran’s nuclear program, but just as concerned about 
managing the overall evolution of  the Iran issue and 
avoiding a “grave error” in not exploring the diplomatic 
route.47
British sanctions policies on Iran flowed from this 
confluence of  national interests and opportunities. EU 
membership may have increased the political cost of  
unilateral action (as there was no legal impact on UK policy), 
but they did not dictate whether the United Kingdom was 
concerned about Iran or what its responsibilities might be 
in addressing the problems created by Iran’s acquisition of  
nuclear weapons.  
Much the same can be said for other EU members. 
EU member states beyond the United Kingdom were 
concerned with ongoing nuclear developments in 
Iran starting in 2002, as is demonstrated by the direct 
involvement of  Germany and France in the EU-3 
negotiating endeavor and subsequent P5+1 approaches. 
But they were not the only states to have concerns about 
Iran’s nuclear program. Countries throughout the European 
Union—but especially northern states like Denmark and 
the Netherlands—were advocates within the European 
Union for a tough sanctions approach throughout the 
2006–2013 period. The Dutch, for example, underscored 
their position in 2011 when they said that EU sanctions 
under consideration at the time “should hit the Iranian 
government in the heart.”48 Other countries within the 
European Union had different positions, some of  which 
is partially attributable to their own national economic 
interests with Iran.49 Ultimately a combination of  factors 
– anxiety with the Iranian nuclear program, outrage over 
human rights abuses, and concern over Iranian rhetoric 
toward Israel – convinced EU member states to back 
sanctions time and again from 2006 to 2013.50 
EU members did have economic exposure in Iran in 
2006-2011 (when the toughest measures were imposed 
but before they took real effect) and this exposure was 
consistent (when one calibrates the 2011 import value 
against the overall high price of  oil).  
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According to data available from Eurostat, the entire 
European Union’s exports to Iran in 2011 were only 10.5 
billion euro, roughly the same as EU exports to Tunisia 
and Serbia. The EU’s imports from Iran in 2011 were 
a little more, around 17 billion euro, and on par with 
Mexico and Thailand. But, still, trade with Iran did not 
represent by 2011 a major, systemic economic interest for 
the European Union (and, indeed, total trade with Iran in 
2011 was only a modest fraction of  the total trade with 
Russia when sanctions were imposed first in 2014, as we 
will discuss next). 
It is impossible to judge with any certainty whether the 
European Union would have pursued this course of  
action had not one of  the EU-27 (later 28) been the 
United Kingdom. But something beyond the economics 
determined EU sanctions policy toward Iran during this 
period, and it is less likely that one country’s diplomats—
even those as persuasive as those in the UK Foreign 
Office—were solely responsible for the shift, than a 
broader decision on the part of  several governments that, 
though they had economic exposure, was the right course 
of  action to take.
Russia
As with Iran, British thinking on Russia sanctions has been 
consistent since March 2014, when the crisis in Ukraine 
erupted over Russia’s moves to seize Crimea.  Then Prime 
Minister David Cameron declared support for Ukraine, 
saying “Britain’s own future depends on a world where 
countries obey the rules.  In Europe, we have spent the 
last 70 years working to keep the peace – and we know 
from history that turning a blind eye when nations are 
trampled over stores up greater problems for the longer 
term.”51 Despite early charges of  hypocrisy for his close 
ties to many wealthy Russians in London,52 Cameron was 
one of  the strongest voices in Europe for sanctions since 
the beginning of  the crisis and became more consistent in 
this regard toward the end of  his premiership.
Since that time, the European Union—with the United 
Kingdom joining in consensus—has imposed several 
rounds of  sanctions against Russia in response to both the 
annexation of  Crimea as well as the Russian-sponsored 
insurgency in Eastern Ukraine. As of  this writing, there is 
no indication that British thinking has shifted in this regard. 
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On August 1, Prime Minister Theresa May reiterated her 
commitment to maintaining the sanctions imposed against 
Russia until the provisions of  the Minsk II agreement 
reached by Russia, Ukraine, France, and Germany in 
February 2015 (which is intended to chart a path toward 
resolution of  the crisis, at least insofar as Eastern Ukraine 
is concerned) are fully satisfied.53 
This perspective has persisted notwithstanding the direct 
economic impact that sanctions on Russia might have on 
the United Kingdom.  Cameron acknowledged this himself  
in 2014, when he said that he was prepared to impose costs 
on the United Kingdom, if  necessary, to support Ukraine 
through the imposition of  sanctions against Russia as 
well as to accept costs to other members of  the EU.54 
Press reporting subsequent to the escalation of  sanctions 
on Russia has substantiated widespread concern within 
Europe that sanctions are having a deleterious effect on 
European economies, including in the United Kingdom.55 
But, as with Iran, it is likely that this problem has been 
overstated with respect to the United Kingdom. The think 
tank “Open Europe” published a report in March 2014 
that underscored the relatively minimal import of  Russia 
to the British economy, noting for example that though 
Russian involvement in the City of  London as a financial 
capital was substantial – as of  2011 at £27 billion – Russian 
investments comprised less than 0.5% of  the total from 
the European Union.56  
Data from the UK Office of  National Statistics is not 
yet available for after 2013. However, the 2015 “Pink 
Book,” which presents the UK Balance of  Payments, 
does contain data from 2011 to 2013 and indicates that 
the Russian position in London had actually increased 
by 2013 to nearly £34 billion.  This represents a larger 
percentage than in 2011 – a little more than 0.8 percent 
-- though still only a fraction of  the total from the EU. 
Despite this, the United Kingdom proceeded with the 
imposition of  sanctions targeting the Russian financial 
sector and Russian oligarchs, both potentially lucrative 
business opportunities for the British financial sector. 
Moreover, the United Kingdom government has been 
described as a leading force in the imposition of  sanctions 
against Russia within the European Union (with a House 
of  Commons report from April 2016 speculating, as did 
former Defense Minister Fallon, that sanctions against 
Russia would have been weaker absent UK insistence).57 
This suggests that British motivations extended beyond 
their direct, immediate economic interests, consistent with 
the language employed by PM Cameron at the time, and in 
turn can help us think through how the UK perception of  
national interest may evolve after BREXIT.  
 
Much the same can be said for certain other members of  
the European Union, especially when other countries – 
particularly those dependent on Russia for their natural 
gas and crude oil supplies – have not only joined in 
the effort but also been its most consistent advocates. 
Germany is an important case in point: German trade 
with Russia as of  2015 – even after sanctions imposition 
– was estimated to be approximately 50 billion euros, even 
more than the financial exposure for the City of  London 
that some spectators have suggested would otherwise 
dampen British enthusiasm for sanctions when the United 
Kingdom departs the European Union.58 
In contrast to the United Kingdom and Germany, 
economic interests have dampened enthusiasm for 
Russian sanctions in other parts of  the European Union. 
In 2014, Deutsche Welle – a leading German newspaper 
– reported that “the country sources 36 percent of  its 
natural gas imports and 39 percent of  its oil imports from 
Russian energy suppliers.”59 This is probably the reason 
why more aggressive sanctions imposition against Russian 
energy exports has yet to be adopted by the European 
Union.  Similarly, a number of  smaller, eastern member 
states – especially those hit hardest by Russia’s retaliatory 
prohibitions on food imports, such as Hungary, Greece, 
and Cyprus – have even suggested the existing sanctions 
should be relaxed.60 But notwithstanding the degree 
to which European economic interests have tempered 
enthusiasm for more sweeping measures against Russia, the 
sanctions that have been imposed have created substantial 
pressure on the Russian economy in the context of  falling 
oil prices (as Nephew has written upon elsewhere).61
Moreover, the sanctions imposed have persisted despite 
pressures from within the European Union on economic 
grounds to reconsider them. This speaks to a larger set of  
concerns on the part of  EU members, whether they are 
security in nature (especially for those in the east)62 or more 
philosophical about interference by foreign powers in the 
domestic affairs of  European countries even outside of  
the European Union.63 These concerns would have existed 
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whether the United Kingdom were part of  the European 
Union or not, just as the United Kingdom might have 
decided to oppose Russian involvement in Ukraine even 
absent the pressures of  NATO on the basis of  the unique 
British historical perspective on European states that 
encroach upon the territorial integrity of  others.64
But, it is possible that were it not for UK participation in 
the European Union and internal pressure from the United 
Kingdom on EU decision-making, the choice of  sanctions 
imposed against Russian actors would have been different 
in each body.  To this point, it is worth considering the 
various distinctions that can be made in sanctions cases 




The British government’s stance against terrorism is well 
established and predates 9/11. The British Home Office 
maintains a list of  “proscribed” terrorist organizations 
under the Terrorism Act of  2000, which also establishes a 
range of  criminal offenses and penalties for participating 
in and conducting business with or on the behalf  of  such 
terror groups.  As of  2016, the United Kingdom had so 
designated seventy international terrorist groups (and their 
associated subgroups).65 British law also holds open the 
possibility of  asset freezes for designated individuals and 
entities.
It is highly unlikely that this stance will change following 
BREXIT.  The British public have themselves been victims 
of  a variety of  terrorist groups over the past decades. In 
fact, BREXIT itself  was sold on the basis of  not only 
lost economic opportunity to immigrants to the United 
Kingdom but also the potential security risks of  EU-
permitted migration, a position that former MI-6 director 
Richard Dearlove took during the debate66 (though also a 
position that was contested67). Regardless of  the veracity 
of  the position, the idea that BREXIT would enhance UK 
security vis-à-vis terrorism strongly indicates that there 
will be continuing support for a sanctions-based response 
to international terrorism. So too does polling data. An 
aggregation of  polling responses from 2010 underscores 
the degree to which Britons expected terrorism to remain a 
national threat and one meriting a government response.68 
A 2015 YouGov poll confirmed terrorism as a primary 
international security concern for the United Kingdom, 
with 77% of  those surveyed ranking it as the most serious 
(even if, on an individual level, it ranked far less important 
in the day-to-day concerns of  UK citizens).69 
Things are not much different at the EU level.  Even 
before terror attacks in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Munich, and 
elsewhere in Europe, EU populations were concerned 
about the threat of  terrorism and their governments 
were responding (though it has shifted over time and 
as conditions change). In 2002, six in ten Europeans 
surveyed believed the United States was rightly concerned 
with the threat of  terrorism (perhaps not surprising, 
coming so soon after 9/11).70 By 2011, however, the threat 
of  terrorism was perceived to be lower than by 2015.71 
Not surprisingly, by 2016, “roughly seven-in-ten or more 
in every country surveyed say that ISIS is a major threat, 
with the greatest concern coming from the Spanish (93%) 
and French (91%).”72 During this period, there has been 
no appreciable concern with the use of  sanctions as a tool 
to combat terrorism, in principle.  Rather, concerns have 
emerged in both the European Union and in the United 
Kingdom about the manner in which designations are 
undertaken (as described above in our examination of  
the Kadi case), and more importantly how one defines a 
terrorist.
That this is a difficult issue is not itself  a surprise:  many 
different countries define terrorism in relation to the 
target of  terrorism – whether the target is an ally or a core 
interest – rather than in the methods used, oftentimes 
mindful of  the larger implication of  the determination 
of  terrorism.  With respect to European consideration of  
sanctions, this has been most pronounced with respect 
to the designation of  Hezbollah.  The United States 
has considered Hezbollah to be a terrorist organization 
since the 1980s.  However, in Europe, there has been 
significant debate over the nature of  Hezbollah and, 
even today, resistance to such a blanket designation.  As a 
consequence of  this, the European Union designated only 
Hezbollah’s “military wing” in July 2013, despite the fact 
that Hezbollah representatives have themselves disagreed 
with the very concept that there are distinct “wings” to the 
organization.  As Matthew Levitt, a well-established expert 
on Hezbollah (among other things) noted in 2013: 
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“In October 2012, Hezbollah Deputy Secretary 
General Naim Qassem was crystal clear on the subject: 
‘We don’t have a military wing and a political one; we 
don’t have Hezbollah on one hand and the resistance 
party on the other...Every element of  Hezbollah, 
from commanders to members as well as our various 
capabilities, are in the service of  the resistance, and we 
have nothing but the resistance as a priority.’”73 
But for many in Europe there was a distinct difference in 
their minds between the political party and the militants 
who plot terrorism. This distinction, which struck some 
in the United States and Israel as counterproductive and 
ill-advised, was necessary in order to address the concerns 
of  European officials with respect to their ability to work 
with the government of  Lebanon, which opposed the 
EU designation.74 The United Kingdom itself  began this 
separation, having sanctioned various elements of  the 
Hezbollah security apparatus starting in 2001 and then the 
full military “wing” in 2008. When the United Kingdom 
proposed EU sanctions on Hezbollah, it kept with this 
practice.75 But, the United Kingdom did not have an easy 
time of  it. The United States had previously encouraged 
EU sanctions on Hezbollah in 2005, but failed to motivate 
reluctant EU governments notwithstanding the support 
of  others.76 An attack in Bulgaria was sufficient to move 
EU governments to act in 2013.  
Many other examples can be noted to highlight the 
distinctions that governments make (e.g., with the Uighurs 
in Western China) when it comes to terrorism designation. 
For the purposes of  this assessment, it is sufficient to 
note that United Kingdom withdrawal from the European 
Union could cut in many different ways insofar as US and 
other sanctions priorities are concerned. Where the United 
Kingdom is opposed to an action, their exit from the 
European Union could make EU-wide sanctions easier; 
where supportive, a positive voice could be lost even as 
the United Kingdom achieves greater freedom of  national 
action. Ultimately, the specifics of  each case will matter 
significantly. And not only with regard to terrorism, a 
similar pattern could emerge with respect to human rights 
sanctions, anticorruption and counter-organized crime 
measures, and other highly targeted sanctions initiatives 
that could emerge.
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VIEWS AND OBSERVATIONS
The preceding sections collectively point to three key 
observations concerning European and British sanctions 
policy after BREXIT.
First and notwithstanding some speculation to the 
contrary, the European Union and United Kingdom 
are likelier to maintain a consistent sanctions 
posture than they are to split, certainly in the near- 
to mid-term. As the three cases demonstrate, European 
and British sentiments on key foreign policy matters in 
which sanctions are employed are largely the same and 
not likely to change simply because the United Kingdom 
is no longer in the EU Council. To suggest otherwise 
is to argue that the only consideration that kept the 
European Union focused on Iran’s nuclear program or 
terrorism was British insistence, or that the British only 
went along with sanctions against Russia because of  EU 
pressure. Certainly it is logical to argue that the pressures 
of  EU membership influenced EU and British policy 
decisions on these matters, but independent reasons exist 
for European and British policy positions in all three 
instances, none of  which will change as a result of  the 
eventual British withdrawal from the European Union.
Moreover, BREXIT’s timetable is uncertain and—with 
Article 50 not having even been triggered at the time of  
this writing—it is plausible that some time will still pass 
before BREXIT becomes inevitable and scheduled. Until 
that time, the European Union and United Kingdom 
will continue to have direct, legal involvement in one 
another’s foreign and economic policies, as defined in 
the Lisbon Treaty. If  Article 50 is triggered in the first 
half  of  2017, as PM May suggested on October 3, then 
the current situation will largely persist through 2019 at 
a minimum.  British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson has 
said that the United Kingdom will continue to work with 
the European Union on Russia sanctions, for example, 
during this period.
Additionally, BREXIT will not spell the end of  EU–UK 
relations, perhaps even on fundamental economic issues. 
Both the European Union and the United Kingdom will 
maintain a close political relationship and aligned political 
interests. The United Kingdom’s global influence is likely 
to diminish. In the immediate term, it faces a difficult 
negotiation with Europe and a domestic debate over the 
nature of  BREXIT. The United Kingdom also could 
be occupied by further political and economic damage 
from the BREXIT decision and the process to come. 
The United Kingdom’s voice both inside and outside 
of  Europe on political decisions is likely to weaken. 
Nonetheless, the United Kingdom is likely to remain a 
close political partner with the European Union. Their 
interests will remain united by geography, politics, 
and sentimentality. The European Union and United 
Kingdom are likely to continue to work together and 
consult closely on their responses to international crises, 
whatever the shape of  BREXIT.
Moreover, the European Union and United Kingdom 
are likely to maintain common economic and trade 
interests. The manner in which BREXIT takes place 
and the relationship that results will be critical to any 
analysis of  the resulting sanctions policy. For example, 
Norway and Switzerland are not part of  the European 
Union. However, both implement EU sanctions, in 
some cases in a manner that is word-for-word what is 
in EU regulation. This is both because of  shared values 
and interests, but also because there is economic value 
in having harmonized trade and financial policies, 
including on sanctions. The United Kingdom may face 
similar pressures and choices if  it remains part of  the 
single market or maintains some other form of  trade 
relationship with the European Union.
Second, there is some chance of  a long-term shift in 
EU and UK perspectives on sanctions, and the two 
entities will more likely prioritize their respective 
economic self-interests. It is entirely plausible that, 
even if  the United Kingdom and the European Union 
maintain some formal relationship after BREXIT, the 
United Kingdom and the European Union will look more 
to their economic self-interests when making decisions 
on the scope and nature of  sanctions decisions. Assuming 
the United Kingdom is able to maintain the role of  the 
City of  London as a financial powerhouse, it is plausible 
that the United Kingdom will find a substantial portion 
of  its economic activity is reliant on providing banking 
services, including to unsavory individuals and entities. 
This, after all, is the aforementioned criticism that was 
laid at the feet of  the British government with regard 
to Russia sanctions in 2014–2015. Without the balancing 
force of  political pressures from Brussels, it is possible 
that a future British government will find its perception 
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of  interests more aligned with avoiding sanctions 
policies that could punish those individuals and entities 
(and, more important, the financial sectors to which they 
belong abroad). This is not to say that such a shift is 
inevitable: as one reviewer pointed out, long prior to the 
creation of  the European Union, the United Kingdom 
was at the forefront of  UN sanctions endeavors and – in 
fact – it may find that sanctions provide it an otherwise 
outsized foreign policy capacity in the absence of  EU 
membership.  But, BREXIT at a minimum puts a different 
UK foreign policy approach on the table at a time when 
the European Union has gained a more significant role in 
international pressure campaigns.
Likewise, the consensus-building requirements of  the 
European Union have led to a curious balancing posture 
when it comes to sanctions: distributed pain, even if  it 
is of  a different character, when sanctions decisions are 
taken. Sanctions regimes adopted by the European Union 
tend to either focus on individuals or entities where the 
impacts are more discrete—such as with the designation 
of  particular terrorists—or they involve sectors in which 
multiple states might have interests. Take, for example, 
sanctions on Iran. For a while, they focused on particular 
actors, the sanctions cost of  which was slight. In time, 
whole industries were targeted but rarely one at a time. 
Instead, as in 2010, the shipping industry was sanctioned 
at the same time as the financial and energy sectors of  
Iran. The result was that every member of  the European 
Union absorbed some cost, even if  the vector and level 
were different. Similarly, the European sanctions on 
Russia balanced restrictions on finance, trade, and energy, 
spreading the burden across the various member states.
One could see a similar scenario developing in the future 
within the European Union, but now without the main 
financial powerhouse of  the City of  London as a balancer. 
While the United Kingdom is not the sole center of  
financial activity for the European Union, with the absence 
of  the United Kingdom from the European Union and 
the limited ability of  the remaining members to impose 
impactful financial sanctions, the European Union will 
find it more difficult to create balance among members in 
order to reduce the burden of  sanctions among those states 
remaining. Without the United Kingdom’s financial sector in 
the scope, to create an equal level of  pressure, EU member 
states might have to intensify their other sanctions tools in 
sectors of  greater significance to more EU members, such as 
embargoes on technology, defense items, and energy services. 
This, in turn, may make it harder for outside actors—like the 
United States—to convince the European Union to adopt 
sanctions or obtain anything beyond toothless action. 
A related issue will be the lost competency that the 
British government brought to EU deliberations.  EU 
member states are well practiced at sanctions design and 
implementation, and there are many governments in the 
EU that can play an enhanced role in this work going 
forward (such as France, Germany and the Netherlands). 
It may also be that the EU bureaucracy in Brussels, which 
has led the charge in the past decade on sanctions despite 
being chronically undermanned for years, will take on 
a greater role.  But, there is no mistaking the amount 
of  time, effort, and energy that the UK applied in the 
sanctions field for the EU.  In the design of  sanctions, 
their defense, and their implementation, the UK brought 
knowledge and ideas that helped to create the system as 
it stands.  That will be lost or – at a minimum – it will be 
different in its execution in the future. 
Third, what’s more likely to change, therefore, is not 
the desire of  the European Union or United Kingdom 
to impose sanctions in response to bad behavior, but 
rather the tools to be used and their severity.  Without 
a need to create balance in sanctions measures, one could 
easily imagine the United Kingdom adopting sanctions 
on a future adversary that include industries of  little value 
while maintaining ties in industries of  significance.  The 
European Union may have the same impulse, especially 
since it will have to manage consensus politics in a way 
that the United Kingdom will not.  
As a result, the European Union and the United Kingdom, 
even when politically inclined to act, are less likely to adopt 
balanced, corresponding measures. This also means that 
EU and UK measures, which may no longer be identical, 
are less likely to correspond with the United States’ 
sanctions. What the United Kingdom ultimately brought 
to the EU table was a combination of  political power, 
influence, and economic stake. The United Kingdom was 
in a position to help create EU policy because it had skin 
in the game and a seat at the table; the European Union, 
in turn, was able to shape UK policy for the same reasons. 
After BREXIT, while the United Kingdom and the 
European Union will remain critical economic actors, the 
impact of  their respective actions will be less than when 
the United Kingdom was party to the European Union, 
and this will complicate both the task of  creating sanctions 
regimes and making them valuable.
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From a policymaking perspective, this leads to two 
recommendations. 
The first is for the European Union and the United 
Kingdom to build into whatever succeeds the UK’s 
formal involvement in the EU the capacity for 
coordination of  sanctions actions. Even if  both the 
United Kingdom and European Union retain separate 
decision-making apparatus for sanctions enforcement, 
establishing a body to coordinate the creation of  sanctions 
rules and propose them to the separate political leaders 
would help to preserve at least some of  the benefits 
that existed prior to BREXIT, particularly balance and 
harmonization. 
Second, the United States should formalize its 
various efforts at sanctions coordination through the 
creation of  “likeminded” coalitions on particular 
issues. Likeminded collectives existed to deal with Iran, 
Russia, and North Korea, and a scaled up approach could 
involve annual gatherings of  European, British, East 
Asian, and other interested governments to discuss a 
range of  sanctions topics. U.S., UK, and EU coordination 
through these groups is common.  But, now, it may be 
increasingly essential to ensure the United Kingdom and 
European Union remain on the same page as the United 
States. These gatherings would not replace the need for 
EU-UK interaction, but they would help create a floor 
for this interaction while at the same time reducing some 
of  the tensions that arise from time to time between the 
United States and its normal sanctions partners.  Taken 
in combination with other mechanisms for EU-UK 
sanctions coordination (such as the presence of  France 
as a permanent member of  the UN Security Council 
alongside the United Kingdom), such a likeminded 
coalition would at a minimum help to smooth the 
transition as BREXIT takes place.
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